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FINDERS-APPLICATION OF STATUTE TO F1NDER OF STOLEN NaN-NEGOTIABLE

BoNDs-Plaintiff found a box containing twenty registered $1000 United States
bonds and other non-negotiable securities, which had been stolen from defendants.
Plaiptiff turned them over to the sheriff who returned them to defendants. The
bonds were endorsed "Not Transferable" and were payable only to the owner
named thereon. Defendants had promptly notified the United States Treasury
of the theft, and by fulfilling certain requirements, could have obtained duplicate
certificates and bonds. Plaintiff sued for a reward of ten per cent of the face value
of the securities under an Iowa statute which provided for a reward of ten per
cent of the value of the property for finding "lost goods, money, bank notes and
other things."1 Held, plaintiff found only evidence of the obligations of the government and not the obligations themselves. He was therefore not entitled to a
reward of ten per cent of the face value of the bonds. De Young v. Foster, (Iowa
1948) 32 N.W. (2d) 664.
Th~ Iowa court, in the earlier case of Flood v. City National Bank of Clinton,2

Iowa Code (1946), §644-13.
218 Iowa 898, 253 N.W. 509 (1934); 95 A.L.R. 1168 (1935); 220 Iowa 935, 263
N.W. 321 (1935). For a criticism of this case, see 68 U.S.L. REv. 230 (1934); and 34
MicH. L. REv. 879 (1936). Goods lost in the legal sense have been parted with inadvertently.
The meaning of the word is extended in the Flood case beyond involuntary loss, to include
those "opposed to desire." See, generally, Aigler, "Rights of Finders," 21 Mi:cH. L. REv. 664
(1923). It is interesting to note that there is stronger basis for saying that the word ''lost"
can apply to stolen instruments than to stolen money. 39 A.L.R. 1242 (1925). Cf., Zech v.
Accola, 253 Wis. 80, 33 N.W. (2d) 232 (1948), noted infra, p. 718, dealing with a Wisconsin statute.
1

2
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held that "stolen" money was "lost" money within the meaning of the above statute and that the finder of stolen money is entitled to the statutory reward. The
court does not decide; in the instant case, whether or not stolen United States
savings bonds come within the scope of the statute. To avoid determining this
question, the court seizes upon supposedly distinguishing features. The Flood
case, the court reasons, involved I_noney, which is specifically mentioned in the
statute. Furthermore, the stolen money was itself the government obligation,
whereas the non-negotiable bonds are mere evidence of the obligations. However,
it would seem that the court could have interpreted the statutory language to
comprehend these securities, for the statute speaks of finding '1ost goods • . . and
other things" as well as "money." Even assuming that the bonds are mere symbols
of debt, they can appropriately be classified as "other things."3 They may have
value as chattels, even though such value is not measured by the debt itself.4 Perhaps implicit in the court's reluctance to include these securities within the statutory language is a desire to restrict the broad interpretation of finders' statutes as
evinced by the Flood case. But in the principal case, the court is called upon to
decide only whether the value of these non-transferable bonds is measured by
the face value of the obligations, and any determination of the applicability of
the statute to mere evidence of the obligations is unnecessary. The claim of the
finder that he is entitled to a reward measured by the value of the obligations
seems correctly rejected:;
William C. Gordon

3 3 BouVIER, LAw DICTIONARY, 3d rev., p. 3268 (1914), defines "things" as "evezy
object, except man, which may become an active subject of right."
4 In such a case, the value might appropriately be called a "nuisance value." 31 C.F.R.
CuM. SuPP. 315-12, prescribes the steps which must be taken before a substitute United
States savings bond is issued.
.
5 Inheritance Tax Division v. The Chamberlin Estate, 21 Wash. (2d) 790, 153 P.
(2d) 305 (1944). The court held that the paper is on!y a symbol or evidence of ownership.
However, at least one court has held that a gift can be made of these non-transferable bonds
by manual delivezy. Matter of Borchardt, 179 Misc. 456, 38 N.Y.S. (2d) 987 (1942).

